


EXHIBIT NO. 15

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


FROM



KD
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)

Tokyo
Dated January 27, 1941
Rec'd. 6:38 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



125, January 27, 6 p.m.

My Peruvian Colleague told a member of my
staff that he had heard from many sources in-
cluding a Japanese source that the Japanese
military forces planned, in the event of trouble
with the United States, to attempt a surprise ~~mass~~
attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military
facilities. He added that although the project
seemed fantastic the fact that he had heard it
from many sources prompted him to pass on the
information.

GREW.

711.94/1935

RS/FF

CONFIDENTIAL

711.94

Strictly
Confidential

PARAPHRASE

The following is the substance of a confidential telegram (no. 125) dated January 27, 1941, from the American Embassy in Tokyo:

Although the following report seemed to the Peruvian Minister to Japan to be fantastic, he nevertheless repeated it to a member of my staff because he had heard it from so many different sources, including a Japanese informant. The report was to the effect that should "trouble" break out between Japan and the United States the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor en masse. They would employ in this attack their entire military equipment.

TD AC
FE:JD:HNS
1/28

FE

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Op16-F-2
 (SC) A16-3/EF37
 Serial No. 09716

Feb. 1, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

10465

From: Chief of Naval Operations
 To: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
 Subject: Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27 January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department to the following effect:

"The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff."

2. The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.

Op-16-F

Jules James,
 By direction

Op-16-F-2 Dictated Jan. 31, 1941

" " by Lieut. Comdr. A.H. McCollum
 Typed by W.E. Morse

CC - Com 14 10466

(SC) A16-3/EF37

*Paraphrase of the telegram must
refer to "Commander Kato," OVI,
system on 11/28/1941.*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BAS

Tokyo

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Dated November 3, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 6:06 a.m.


Secretary of State,

4. Nov. 1941

Washington.

1736, November 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND
UNDER SECRETARY ONLY.



One. I telegraphed textually on November 1
(please see Embassy's 1729, November 1, 4 p.m.)

a translation of the leading article in that morning's
NICHU NICHU which under the banner headline "Empire
approaches its greatest crisis" preceded a New York
despatch summarizing a statement reportedly given
to the NEW YORK TIMES by the Japanese Embassy at
Washington with regard to the need for putting a
stop to the economic war between the United States
and Japan. That article and the paper's editorial
also telegraphed textually (Embassy's 173, November
1, 7 p.m.) closely reflect the atmosphere now pre-
vailing in this country as we sense it.

Two. There is nothing to add to my analyses
as presented in the telegrams over the past several
months of the factors which affect Japan's policy;

nor do I

711.94/2406

PS/WHM

Confidential

APR 22 1943

-2- #1736, November 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Tokyo.

nor do I see need for substantially revising them.

I believe that Japan's position can conclusively
be estimated by applying.

GREW

HSM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MEV

Tokyo

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 10:29 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1736, November 3, 3 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

to the situation which now seem to be shaping up certain considerations as follows:

(a) Japan cannot dissociate either herself or the China conflict from the European war and its fluctuations.

(b) Unlike public opinion in the democracies where there exists a homogeneous body of principles directing or influencing foreign policies and where differences of opinion are more likely to arise from consideration of methods rather than of principles public opinion in Japan where political thought varies from medievalism to liberalism is a variable quantity and at any given time only that school of thought predominates which is brought to the top by the impact of conditions and events outside the country. It was the impact of the German victories in Western Europe last year which brought to power the pro-Axis elements;

-2-

1736, November 3, 3 r. ., (SECTION 70), from
elements; the failure of Germany to ...
thereby creating doubt concerning the ...
tory of Germany,

GREY

RR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

No. _____
 This telegram was received from _____
 at _____ on _____
 at _____
 FROM _____

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

1738, November 3, 3 p.m., (SECRET)
 was among other matters "advised to strengthen the
 moderate elements, while the attack on Germany
 Russia, by upsetting the calculation of mutual
 needs between those two countries, through realiza-
 tion that those who had taken Japan into the
 Axis alliance had misled the country.

C. The efforts of Prince Konoys, and the
 efforts which the present Cabinet promises to put
 forward, to adjust relations with the United States
 and thus to open up a way to conclude peace with
 China, represent an attempt to correct last year's
 error. If that attempt should fail, and if Ger-
 man arms should continue to be successful, I look
 to see a final and closer alignment of Japan
 with the Axis.

D. The theory put forward by many of our
 leading economists that depletion and eventual
 exhaustion of economic and financial resources
 would

-- 1745, November 8, 3 p.m., (SECTION THREE), from Tokyo

and in short time bring about the collapse of

and all this is never has never seemed

GREW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible. It appears to be the body of a telegram, possibly starting with a salutation like 'TO THE PRESIDENT' and containing several lines of text. The content is too light to transcribe accurately.]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EAS

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo

FROM Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 10:44 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1738, November 3, 4:1 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

states appeared to be futile and unwise. As previously pointed out, it was the subsequent foreign policy of the United States which, combined, added to the impact upon Japan of political developments abroad, that brought the Japanese Government to seek conciliation with the United States. Should these efforts fail, the pendulum in Japan will in all probability swing back once more to its former position, or still farther back, leading to what I have called "an all-out, all-out" attempt to resist Japan the advice to resist from all quarters, even risking national honor and life rather than yield to foreign pressure. These of course feed the national psychology and temper from day to day realize beyond her imagination that such a contingency is not only possible but probable.

Fair. Sent to the Secretary of State and the

1. Defendant

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

8
H
Poff
FE

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (SC)



Tokyo

Dated November 3, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 3:39 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1736
~~254~~, November 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

uncertain hypothesis upon which to base the considered policy and measures of the United States. Our own view is that such a course if taken would not (repeat not) avert war. Nevertheless both views are no more than opinion, and it is therefore our belief that it would be contrary to our national interests to postulate the correctness of either opinion and to erect thereon a definitive policy. To do so would be to put the cart before the horse. The primary point for decision would appear to involve the question as to whether our national needs, policies and objectives justify war with Japan in the event that diplomacy, our first line of national defense, should fail, for only on the basis of such decision could the administration follow a course divested so far as possible of elements of opinion, speculation and uncertainty. I do not doubt that such decision, which might well prove to be

11.44

FW 711.34/2406 (SECTION SIX) b. Confidential File

-2- #1737, November 3, 3 p.m. from Tokyo

to be irrevocable, has already been fully debated and adopted, for the sands are running fast.

FIVE. Please realize that in discussing the foregoing grave and momentous subject I am out of touch with the Administration's thoughts and intentions thereon and that it is far from my intention to imply that

GREW

EMB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram was received from the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D. C., on December 1, 1941, at 11:41 a. m.

FROM

Secretary of State

Washington

1941, December 1, 3 p. m. (SECTION 2-101)

An uncalculated policy is being followed in Washington. It is especially far from a realistic one for a single moment to advocate so-called "appeasement" on the part of the United States or that our Government should in the slightest degree recede from the fundamental principles which it has laid down as a basis for the adjustment and conduct of international relations including our relations with Japan. Methods may be flexible but with principles there should be no compromise. My purpose is only to ensure against my country's getting into war with Japan through any possible misapprehension of the capacity of Japan to rush headlong into a suicidal conflict with the United States. National sanity would dictate against such an event, but Japanese sanity cannot be measured by our own standards of logic. We need not be over-concerned by the present bellicose tone and substance of the Japanese press which has attacked the United States in recurrent waves of intensity during the past several years, but it would be shortsighted to underestimate Japan's obvious

preparations

-2- #1736, November 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN) from Tokyo
preparations for a program to be implemented if her
alternative program for peace should fail. It would be
similarly shortsighted to base our policy on the be-
lief that these preparations are merely in the nature
of saber rattling the exclusive purpose of giving
moral support to Japan's high pressure diplomacy.
Japan's resort to measures which might war with the
United States inevitably may come with dramatic and
dangerous suddenness.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GREW

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS
NOV 18 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased but
not be communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo
Dated November 17, 1941
Rec'd 2:00 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
NOV 18 1941
MR. WELLES

Division of
East Asian Affairs
NOV 18 1941
NOTED

1814, November 17, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND
UNDER SECRETARY ONLY.

Reference Embassy's 1736, November 3, 3 p.m.,
last sentence.

In emphasizing need for guarding against
sudden military or naval actions by Japan in
areas not at present involved in the China con-
flict, I am taking into account as a probability
that the Japanese would exploit all available
tactical advantages, including those of initia-
tive and surprise. It is important, however,
that our Government not (repeat not) place upon
us, including the military and naval attaches,
major responsibility for giving prior warning.
The control in Japan over military information,
both primary and secondary is extremely effective,
and we have no expectation that any advance in-
formation would be obtained either through the
press

74.54
707
740.0011 P.W.

HMC

NOV 28 1941

PS/WHM
FILED

Confidential File

711.94/2447

-2- #1814, November 17, 8 p.m., from Tokyo

press or from personal contacts with Japanese; the few Americans left in Japan are mostly concentrated in Tokyo, Yokohama and Kobe, and are in no position to observe military movements; and the absence of American and other foreign vessels in adjacent waters almost assures to the Japanese the ability to despatch troop transports in various directions without foreign observation. Recent reports from our consuls at Taihoku and at Harbin point to Japanese troop concentrations in both Taiwan and Manchuria, and all other available indications are that since the general mobilization of July last, troop dispositions have been made to enable new operations to be carried out on the shortest possible notice in either Siberia or the southwest Pacific or in both.

We fully realize that possibly our most important duty at this time is to watch for preliminary indications of military operations which might be forthcoming in such areas, and we are taking every precaution to guard against surprise. However, our
field

-3- #1814, November 17, 8 p.m., from Tokyo.

field of military and naval observation is almost literally restricted to what can be seen with our own eyes, which is negligible. We would, therefore, advise that our government, from abundance of caution, discount as far as possible the likelihood of our being able to give substantial warning.

GREW .

LMS